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Abstract
Network forensics concerns the identification and preservation of evidence from an event that has
occurredorislikelytooccur.Thescopeofnetworkforensicsencompassesthenetworks,systemsand
devicesassociatedwiththephysicalandhumannetworks.Inthispaperweareassessingtheforensic
potential of a router in investigations.  A single router is taken as a case study and analysed to
determine its forensic value from both static and live investigation perspectives. In the live
investigation, tests using steps from two to seven routers were used to establish benchmark
expectations for network variations.  We find that the router has many attributes that make it a
repositoryandasiteforevidencecollection.Theimplicationsofthisresearchareforinvestigators
andtheinclusionofroutersinnetworkforensicinvestigations.
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INTRODUCTION
Digital forensics concerns the investigation of any matter of information or data, stored or
transmittedinabinaryformthatmayberelieduponasevidence.Asaconsequencemanyspecialist
sub fields are encapsulated by digital forensics including network forensics, computer forensics,
satellite forensics, browser forensics and so on (Balen, Martinovic & Hocenski, 2012). This paper
concerns Network forensics and the one instance that of the router (Battisha, 2008). A network
forensicinvestigationrequiresthecapturing,recordingandanalysingofnetworkevidenceandthe
audit trails (Choi & Dai, 2004). The outcome of such investigations may deliver security audit,
securityknowledgetohardenasystemorevidenceforlegalpurposes.Thescopeofthispaperisto
focussolelyonthelegalevidentialvalueoftherouter(Cisco,2008;Cisco,2009).Asaconsequence
boththestaticandthedynamicpotentialforevidencedisclosureareevaluatedandthesystematic
approachforinvestigationdocumented.Considerationisalsomadeforincludingtherouterin the
scopeofinvestigationsandasacriticalcomponentinaforensicallyreadycomputernetwork.

THESCOPEOFNETWORKINVESTIGATION
Digitalinvestigation concernsscientific tasks,techniquesandpracticesusedintheinvestigationof
storedortransmittedbinaryinformationordata.Thescopeofinvestigationisboundedbydevices
andsystemsinwhichbinarydataistransmitted,processedandstored.Thepeopleassociatedwith
the networks and computing systems are also in scope and may provide valuable evidence and
access to evidence. In these senses the deliverable from an investigation is evidence for the
requirements of an IT audit, a post event system hardening, or legal action. In each instance the
theoreticalframeworkforcollectionandthemethodsforprocessingtheevidencearedifferent(see
Figure 1). An IT audit (internal or external) is conducted to assess the performance of the security
controls against benchmarks and risk criteria (Figure 1: A). These audits include forensic audit of
breaches and security audits of vulnerabilities. The scope is based on the determined audit
objectives; for example of security (confidentiality, integrity and availability), quality (effectiveness
andefficiency),fiduciary(complianceandreliability),serviceandcapacity(Cui,Xu,Xu,&Wu,2002).
TheoutcomeofanITAuditisareportthataddressestheauditobjective.SecurityauditandDigital
forensic investigation overlap in the area of postevent evaluation (see Figure 1: B). Security audit
providesanexplanationofaneventintermsofthevariationaroundcontrolsandcanshowsystem
strengths, the untreated residual risks, and the vulnerabilities. The security audit report provides
guidancefortheITdevelopersonhowtheyshouldhardenthesystemagainstfutureattackandto
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implement system improvement in IT terms.  In the same space Digital forensic investigation may
alsooccurtoexplainthesameeventintermsofthelegalconsequences.Theconsequencesmaybe
toprosecuteanattacker,defendagainstprosecutionoranyotherrelatedlegalaction.Theoutputof
such investigation is a technical report that is prepared in accordance with the rules for an expert
witness and using professional processes that are compliant with the admissibility of evidence to
courts. This report has different criteria and evidence collection methods than a report for system
improvementandmaybeequallyappliedtoareasBandC(seeFigure1:C).Thelegalreportfrom
area C may be used for civil or criminal matters or for prosecution or defence of matters. In this
paperweareprincipallyconcernedwithinvestigationthatiscompliantwithareaCofFigure1and
theinclusionofrouterevidenceinthescopetheinvestigation.



Figure1.ClassificationbyUseofSystemInvestigationEvidence


Networkforensicshastraditionallyfocusedonthecapture,recordingandanalysisofnetworkevents
inordertodiscoverevidentialinformationaboutthesourceofsecurityattack(Feng&Hamdi,2009;
Fernandez,Pelaez&LarronodoPetrie,2007).ThisviewofnetworkforensicsfitsareaBofFigure1
andreflectsthefunctionofdigitalforensicstoprovideevidencefortheimprovement(hardening)of
the security system. Unlike computer forensics that mainly deals with imaging static evidence in
physical devices such as hard drives, memory sticks and other digital repositories; traditional
networkforensicsisliveandlargelydealswithnetworkpacketfilters,firewallsandwirelessframes
(Gottlieb,Greenberg,Rexford&Wang,2003).However,suchascopebetterfitsareaBofFigure1.In
area C of Figure 1 the scope of network forensics requires the investigator to have the ability to
determinethefullextentofnetworkrelatedevidencethatisinclusiveofthenetwork,thedevices
andsystemsassociatedandthepeopleinvolved.Suchascopeiswiderthanthetraditionalviewof
network forensics and involves theoretical frameworks that are IT related, legally related and
mediating mechanisms to facilitate differences. The focus of such investigation requirements
extends the scope of network forensic investigation into multidisciplinary domains and towards
multitasking outcomes based on the classification by use of system investigation evidence
(Hiromori,Yamaguchi,Yasumoto,Higashinoz&Taniguchi,2003).

“This is the time to change our focus from the negative (hacker) to the positive
(Internet Forensics specialist) dimension of this exciting new discipline”  (Hyung &
Kang,2011).
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The current scope of network forensics is to be inclusive of social networks and to consider the
preparationofanetworkforinvestigation(Kadloor,Gong,Kiyavash,&Venkitasubramaniam,2010).
The scope includes both static and live evidence and consequently techniques for the forensic
processesofcollection,examination,analysisandreportingofdigitalevidencemustbeappropriate
respectively for both (Lammle, 2011a & b). The gathering of digital evidence in area C requires
preparationforpresentedinacourtoflaw.Theimplicationisforintegrityandcostefficiency.The
volumeofevidenceavailableinacomputernetworkisoftenfargreaterthantheresourcesavailable
tocollectandpreserveeverythingandthenatureofmanynetworkcomponents(suchasmemory
repositoriesroutersorintrusiondetectionsystems)issuchthatmuchevidenceisvolatileandonly
momentarilyavailable.Investigationproceduresmustcomplywiththestandardsofevidenceforthe
identificationandacquisitionofdigitalevidence,preservingtheintegrityoftheacquiredevidence,
forensic analysis or examination of acquired evidence, and the presentation and reporting of the
obtained digital evidence in an appropriate manner (Lijun, Dan, Zhang & Rayehauduri, 2011).
Forensically ready systems have designed subsystems to collect acceptable evidence and to
minimisethecostofsuchactivity(McHugh,McLeod&Nagaonkar,2008).Anorganisationmayalso
have a strategic goal to prosecute attackers or to have sufficient evidence available of prioritised
organisationalactivitiessothateffectiveandcosteffectivedefencesmaybemade.Insuchsituations
preparingacomputernetworkforevidentialpurposesiswithinthescopeofnetworkforensicsand
prudentintheexpectationofdigitalinvestigations.

ROUTERARCHITECTURE
InourstudywefocusedononerouterfromtheCisco2800seriesasacasestudyforstaticandlive
analysis.Theserouterswerereadilyavailableinthelaboratoryandwereusedasaproxytoestablish
ageneralmethodforrouterinvestigationsandtoevaluatetheevidentialworth.

StaticAnalysis
A router is a network device that forwards data packets to other components of a computer
network.Fundamentallytherouterreceivesincomingdatapackets,readstheheaderinformation,
determines a destination and then forwards packet appropriately (McMillan, 2011). The
determinationofdestinationismadebytheembeddedroutingtablefortheparticularrouter(Misra
&Kharoliwalla,2001).Thefunctionoftherouterisoperationalintwoplanes;thecontrolplanethat
uses a stored routing table and the physical interface connections or static routes, and the
forwardingplanethatmanagesthereadingofincomingpacketsandthecorrectforwardingactions.
Thesubjectofstaticanalysisishencethephysicalrouteranditsarchitecture(Murakami,Kai,Irie,&
Sasaki,2009).
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Figure2.Cisco2800seriesCaseRouterArchitecture[4]


The static analysis of the case router shows (Figure 2) many components that have fault value in
areasAandBofFigure1andfourthatcanactasrepositoriesofstoredinformationforanareaC
investigation. Components 6, 12, 14 and 15 (Figure 2) are memory chips of different types and of
differentworthtothefunctionalityofarouter.Aseries2800Ciscorouterhas64MBor128MBof
flashmemoryand256MBofDRAMmemory.Inadditionanyoftheseslotsmaybecustomisedwith
alternativecapacitiesformemory.ModernroutershaveincreasedstaticanddynamicRAMbuffers
to enhance the performance of router path calculations and improve the general through put of
packets (Narayan, Lutui, Vijayakumar & Sodhi, 2010). Although these enhancements have been
made for performance reasons the benefit is also for static retention of evidence buffer load by
buffer load. Simple RAM dump evidence collected using a number of different software and the
potentialforfurtherresearchintosequencesofbufferdumpsinliveacquisitionisapparent.

LiveAnalysis
Thefunctionalvalueofarouteristoprincipallyreceive,readheaders,calculatetheoptimaladdress
forforwarding,andtoforwardthedatapackets.Traditionallytheroleofnetworkforensicshasbeen
inthemonitoringandliveacquisitionofdatapackets.Theobjectiveisnotonlytodetectexceptions
buttoattempttotracebacktothesourceoftheevent.Mostexceptionsarecomplexeventswhere
attemptshavebeenmadetohidetheevidencerequiredtoprosecuteanattacker.Atbestdefensive
actions may be taken to block traffic by profile identification, load balancing or header sniffing.
Where the origin of a packet is hidden by spoofing the source IP addresses different IP traceback
mechanisms were developed and most of them fall into the four main categories of; linktesting
hopbyhop tracing, messaging, logging and packet marking’[22, 23]. These traceback mechanisms
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were developed according to various situations and most of them depend on collecting a huge
amountofpacketsfromtheroutersalongtheattackingpath.Withoutcollectingsufficientpackets,
tracing back the hackers is extremely hard and sometimes impossible.  Although trace back
mechanismscanbeveryeffectiveandpreciseintracingbackthehackers,itmaybetoocostlyand
complicated to implement.  Instead of collecting the stream of packets from the routers to
reconstruct the attacking path, the TimeToLive (TTL) field within theIP packet provides another
source of valuable information for the investigators and is often called the hop count distance
method.ThemethodonlyrequiresonepacketandidentificationoftheoriginatingOperatingSystem
(OS)inordertotracebacktothenearestoriginatingrouter(Cisco,2008).

METHOD
Inordertotestthevalueofarouterinstaticanalysisonlyonerouterisrequired(Sabir,Fahiem&
Mian, 2009). Principally the identification of storage repositories, the relative capacities, refresh
rates and allocation algorithms are sufficient to fit an investigation scope. However, live forensic
acquisition is more complex and requires many networked routers. In this research we selected
Cisco2800seriesroutersbecausetheywereavailableinthelaboratoryandtheysupporteddynamic
routing in IPv6 (Sarikhani, Mahranian & Hoseini, 2010). The network architecture was kept simple
andstartedwithtworouters(seeFigure4)andwasthenscaleduptofourandsevenrouters.Ofthe
many factors influencing live analysis we selected measures of throughput in relation packet size,
routing protocol and the number of routers as being helpful in establishing normal network
behaviouralpatterns.Furthertestingmeasureddelays(Jitter)intheprocessingofpackages.Sucha
metrichasvalueinlocatingexceptionsfromthebenchmarkbaseline.

Inthetestbedthesender,receiverandtwoCiscorouterswereconnectedinseriesusingcrossover
cable.Amegabitswitchwassqueezedinbetweensenderandreceivertokeepthedatatransmission
toamaximumof100Mbps,asthecrossovercablesandnetworkcardsonsender,receiverandon
routersisGigabitcapable.

TheHardwarespecificationofbothsenderandreceiverwas:

Processors:
IntelCore2Duo,CPU6300@1.86GHz

RAM:

Module1DDR2,1024Mbytes
Module2DDR2,1024MBytes

NetworkCard:
Broadcom1G/bitadapter.
IntelProS/1000(1G/bit)adapter

SinceCiscoRouterssupportmultipleprotocols(IPv4&IPv6)onsameinterfacewehaveconfigured
IPv4andIPv6addressesoneachinterfaceofbothCiscoRouters.SimilarlybothRoutersarerunning
RIPandRIPngsimultaneouslyforIPv4andIPv6routing.InthistestwehaveinstalledServer2008on
bothsenderandreceiver(Seong&Reddy,2008).ThereisnoparticularreasonforchoosingServer
2008aswecanuseanyOperatingSystemfortesting.Thelogserverwasremovedasbothsender
and receiver can act as the log servers. There were no other settings changed to enhance the
Operating System’s performance (Telidevara, Chandrasekaran, Srinivasan, Mukkamala & Gampa,
2010).
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Figure3.Liveacquisitiontestbed

FINDINGS
Theevaluationofthecaseproxyrouterforitsevidentialvalueshowedbothstaticandlivepotential
forevidencecollection.Thewaysarouterhasbeencustomisedintermsofthephysicalhardware,
thelogicwareandtheoptionsthatarebeingused(suchassecurityandintrusiondetectionsettings)
adds variation to the amount and extent of evidence that may be available. The two problems
arisingintheresearchthathaveimplicationsforinvestigatorsarethevolatilityofdatainthestatic
analysisandtheimmensevolumeofdataintheliveanalysis.Evidencefrominvestigationishencea
sub set of all possible evidence and consequently the methods and limitation of the evidence
collectionmethodsrequiredeclarationintheareaCreport.

StaticAnalysis
Theprincipalchallengeforaninvestigatorinastaticsystemanalysisisthevolatilityofthedatatobe
collected.Memorydumpsmaybeobtained(usingsoftwaresuchasHelixProandothers)butnotall
the evidence on a system is going to last very long. What is stored and how it is stored can be
determinedfromthesoftwareconfigurationsbuttheactualcontentvaluewillonlybeasnapshotof
themostrecentevents.Someevidenceresidesinstoragethatrequiresaconsistentpowersupply;
otherevidencemaybestoredinmemorythatiscontinuouslychangingorbeingoverwritten.When
collectingtheevidenceintheexperiment,weprioritisedbyvolatilityfromthehighesttothelowest
andresolvedTable1forabestpracticeguide.

Table1.Routerevidencecollectionprioritiesbyvolatility


Order
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

Element
Registersandcache
Routingtables
Arpcache
Processtable
Kernelstatisticsandmodules
Mainmemory
Temporaryfilesystems
Secondarymemory
Routerconfiguration
Networktopology
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LiveAnalysis
Intheexperimentmattersthathavebeentestedbyotherresearcherswereacceptedascomplete
(for example TTL field metrics, traceback and so on) (Paruchuri, Durresi & Chellappan (2008); Pilli,
Joshi&Niyogi,2011a&b);andvaluabletoourresearch.Ourfocuswastotestforothervariations
thathaveaninfluenceontheidentificationofnetworkevidenceandtoreportmeasuresthatshow
the expected variations as benchmark measures (Vacca, 2005; Wei, 2005). The approach was
designed to add knowledge that an investigator should consider within the scope of a router
investigation.Itistominimisetheinclusionoffalseleads(positiveandnegative)inaninvestigation.
ConsequentlytheresultsforUDPandTCPbenchmarkingarereportedhere,andtheJittervaluesof
expectdelaysforarouternoted(Yan&Sik,2010;Zhou,Fei,Narayan,Haeberlen,Loo&Sherr,2011).

UDPBenchmarking
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IPv4 UDP vs IPv6 UDP on Network
with 4 Routers
110
Throughput
(Mbps)

90
70

IPv4 - UDP 4
Routers

50

IPv6 - UDP 4
Routers

30

Packet Size(Bytes)



IPv4 UDP vs IPv6 UDP on Network
with 7 Routers
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Charts13.UDPRouterperformance
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Forthesmallestpacketsize,UDP64Bytes,UDPIPv6alwaysgives15%morethroughputthanIPv4
on all network setups. With the 2 router network, packet sizes 256, 768 and 1024 Bytes, IPv6
performancedroppedby5%.Therestofthepacketsizesareverysimilarinregardstothroughput
values. On the network with 4 routers, packet sizes ranging from 256 to 1536 Bytes, IPv6
performancedroppedby10%.Onthenetworkwith7routers,forallpacketsizesrangingfrom256
to1536Bytes,IPv6performancedroppedby3%.Fromtheseresults,itcanbeconcludedthatasthe
packet size increases, IPv6 performance degrades as compared to IPv4. These variations require
considerationinliveforensicevidencecollectionasastandardrouterperformancewillnecessarily
vary within the overall network performance and alsoin relation to other factors identified in the
experiment. Tuning of detection systems and mining algorithms can minimize false positives and
negativesinliveanalysis.

TCPBenchmarking
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IPv4 TCP vs IPv6 TCP on Network
with 7 Routers
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Charts46.TCPRouterperformance
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Inanetworkwith2Routersandasmallerpacketsizerangingfrom64to384BytesIPv4shows1%
higherthroughputthanIPv6.Forrestofthepacketsizesrangingfrom512to1536BytesIPv4shows
2%higherthroughputthanIPv6,exceptforthepacketsizeof1024Bytes,wherebothIPv4&IPv6
hassimilarthroughput.Inanetworkwith4RoutersIPv4shows2%higherthroughputthanIPv6for
packetsizerangingfrom 64to384Bytes.Forthe packetsizeof512BytesbothIPv4andIPv6has
similarthroughput.Similarly,forthepacketsizerangingfrom768to1536BytesIPv4throughputis
2% higher than IPv6 except for the packet size of 1024 Bytes, where the difference is 1%. In a
networkwith7RoutersIPv4shows1%higherthroughputthanIPv6forthepacketsizesrangingfrom
64to1536Bytes,exceptpacketsizeof768Byteswherebothshowssimilarthroughput.Thereforeit
canbeconcludedthatIPv4outperformsIPv6by2percent.

These variations for protocol, packet size and network complexity require consideration in live
forensicevidencecollectionasastandardrouterperformancewillnecessarilyvarywithintheoverall
network performance and these factors identified in the experiment. Tuning of detection systems
andminingalgorithmscanminimizefalsepositivesandnegativesinliveanalysis.

PacketDelayBenchmarking
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Chart7.UDPPacketDelay



Anetworkof2routersusingUDPasthetransportprotocol,IPv6hasanaverageof30milliseconds
moredelayirrespectiveofpacketsizethannetworkof2routersrunningonIPv4.Inanetworkof4
routers, also using UDP as transport protocol, IPv4 has an average of 50 milliseconds less delay
irrespectiveofpacketsizethannetworkof4routersrunningonIPv6.Whenincreasingthenumber
ofnetworknodesto7routers,thenetworkrunningonIPv6,usingUDPastransmissionprotocol,it
hasasimilarperformancetoanetworkrunningonIPv4withthesamenumberofnodes(Routers).
IPv6hasanaverageof75millisecondsmoredelay.Basedonalloftheabovestatements,itcanbe
concluded that, as the number of network nodes increases, IPv6 protocol generates more delays
than IPv4 protocol. These delays for an expected distribution and events falling outside of these
benchmarks may be interpreted as exceptions. Such exceptions require investigation whereas the
valueswithintheexpecteddistributionmayonlyrequirecontentanalysis.
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IPv4 vs IPv6 - TCP Average Delay
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Chart8.TCPPacketDelay


Anetworkof2routersusingTCPastransportprotocol,IPv6hasanaverageof34millisecondsmore
delay irrespective of packet size than a network of 2 routers running on IPv4. In network of 4
routers,alsousingTCPasthetransportprotocol,IPv4hasanaverageof42millisecondslessdelay
irrespectiveofpacketsize,thannetworkof4routersrunningonIPv6.Whenincreasingthenumber
of network nodes to 7 routers, the network running on IPv6, using TCP as transmission protocol
again has more average delay than the IPv4. For a packet size of 64 Bytes in particular, IPv6
generated an average of 228 milliseconds more than IPv4. For larger packet sizes (256 to 1536
Bytes),anetworkrunningonIPv6generatedanaverageof105millisecondsmorethananetworkof
7RoutersrunningusingIPv4protocolastransportprotocol.

Based on all of the above statements and the relevant charts,it can be concluded that, as the
numberofnetworknodesincreases,irrespectiveofpacketsize,IPv6protocolgeneratesmoredelays
thanIPv4protocol.Thesearedelaysforanexpecteddistributionandeventsfallingoutsideofthese
benchmarks may be interpreted as exceptions. Such exceptions require investigation whereas the
values within the expected distribution may only require content analysis. Our research helps an
investigator to focus where to look for evidence, to filter out controlled system variations and to
prioritisetheuseofresources.

CONCLUSION
Thescopeofdigitalinvestigationandnetworkforensicsoughttoincluderouters.We haveshown
thatfrombothastaticandaliveperspectivevaluableevidencemaybefoundinrouters.Ourtests
have shown that various factors contribute to network performance and these variations can be
expectedinthenormalfunctionofacomputernetwork.Hencenormalvariationsthatareincontrol
can be filtered out of focus for investigation and the technical resources applied for analysis of
criticalsystemattributes.Exceptionstothebenchmarks(thatmustbeestablishedforeachnetwork)
andcontentanalysisrequireinclusionininvestigations.Wefindthattherouterhasmanyfeatures
thatmayassisttheretentionandidentificationofevidencewhentheallthefeaturesareswitched
on or programmed.  The implications of this research extend beyond enhancing the scope for
networkinvestigationsandintoadviceforpreparingaforensicallyreadynetwork.Furtherresearch
istobedonetosequentiallyexaminememorydumpsinscenariotestingandtowriteabestpractice
forensicreadinessassuranceguidelinefornetworkmanagers.
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